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DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AMENDMENTS

TO

2 MARCH 1951 CIA DRAFT. NIE-29: MUGOSLAVIA

1. Reference page 2, par. 3. line 6: Change as follows: "....

- Reference page 2. par. 4: Delete and substitute as follows:
 "Degoclaria could not defend steel equipment a substitute as follows:

 Seen notificating Satellite persons (Balgaria, Brandon Rungsey, and

 Alberta) 45 this actual ways are sendeded under smidted command and wick

 Call legistical support for the USSR. The Regular would resist,

 becomes, and wall conduct controlls appropriately for each time of

 a major sustained Satellite attack on Yaroslavia, under Seviet central

 direction, the advantages which they would nessess in full Seviet logis
 tical support, substantially greater numbers of troops, and superiority
 in mechanized forces, would insure eventual collapse of formal military
 resistance. The Ingoslavs would resist, however, and would conduct
 guarrilla-type operations long after the collapse of formal military
 resistance."
- 3. Reference page 3. par. 6. line 3: Add the following: ". pariod of resistance to a full-scale Soviet-Satellite attack, and would greatly increase the cost thereof to the Soviet Union. Conceivably the expectation of such a cost, particularly when considered also in connection with the risk of general war, might be sufficient to discourage the launching of such a venture."

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- 4. Reference page 3. par. 7: Change to par. 9.
- 5. Reference page 3. par. 8: Change to par. 7.
- Reference page 4. par. 9: Change to par. 8 and rewrite as follows: "Whe-Evenlin-may-estimate-that-a-Sctollite-invasion-of-Yeseelorbe-corld-be-corried-through-cucoessallg-without-presiptations <u>al-eq-l-of-qay-fatorong-be-klatoribaterofitarofitarofi-qafi</u> cooca-ot-lebte-ot-ot-ot-ot-ot-ot-del-unlocalevalecalevales-ot-as-staling-to-coo a-cubstantial-wisk-of-prosiphtating-gonoral-wary On the basis of available intelligence we are unable to determine in fact if the Soviets have made the decision to attack Yugoslavia in 1951. (While the USSR probably would not decide to launch any attack on Yugoslavia in 1951, unless it is willing to accept the risk of precinitating general war, the Kremlin may astimate that the important relation of Yucoslavia to the Western world has not yet been sufficiently realized by the West, and hence that a Satellite invasion of Yugoslavia could be carried through successfully in 1951 without precipitating general war: they may consider that the risk of general war increases after 1951. We believe such an attack in 1951 must be considered a seed serious possibility."

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DESCROR OF INTELLIGENCE, UNITED STATES AIR FORCE AMENUMENTS

2 MARCH 1951 CIA DRAFT. NIE-29: YUGOSLAVIA

- Reference page 2. par. 3. line 6: Change as follows: ". Satellites the capability of launching a secsessal major invasion of. . "
- Reference page 2, par, 4: Delete and substitute as follows: "Begonlastic-coold-not-decid-tend-linguisch-decided-utinot-decided-ptice four-mightonian-Satollito-powers (Relimeto, Remedies-Responses Alberto)-45-4kle-sotsede-reso-seedrot-de-redor-melos-melétod-oomined-and-with investigated and and and and and appropriations for some time ester-the collapse of formal relitary rects tensors. "In the event of a major sustained Satellite attack on Yugoslavia, under Soviet Central direction, the advantages which they would pessess in full Soviet logistical support, substantially greater numbers of troops, and superiority in machanized forces, would insure eventual collapse of formal military resistance. The Yugoslave would resist, however, and would conduct guerrilla-type operations long after the collapse of formal military resignance, n
- Reference page 3, par. 6, line 3: Add the following: ". . period of resistance to a full-scale Soviet-Satellite attack, and would greatly increase the cost thereof to the Soviet Union. Conceivably the Avosciation of such a cost particularly when considered also in connection with the risk of general war, might be sufficient to discourage the Januaching of such a venture."

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- 4. Reference mage 3. par. 7: Change to par. 9.
- 5. Reference page 3. par. 8: Change to par. 7.
- Reference page 5, par. 9: Change to par. 8 and rewrite as follows: "@po_Kromlin-may-oc+imato-that-a-facollitec-thres102-oc-<u>Xugo</u>elevin-could-de-cervici-through-cuse-coldally-uithert-probipitating entertantial wink-of-proofpicating-general way On the basis of available intelligence we are unable to determine in fact if the Soviets have made the decision to attack Yugoslavia in 1951. While the USSR probably would not decide to launch any attack on Yugoslavia in 1951, unless it is willing to accent the risk of precipitating general war, the Kramlin may estimate that the important relation of Yugoslavia to the Western world has not yet been sufficiently realized by the West, and hence that a Satellite invasion of Yugoslavia could be carried through successfully in 1951 without precipitating general war: they may consider that the risk of general war increases after 1951. We believe such an attack in 1951 must be considered a seal serious possibility."

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